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Background:  
Using revenue as a basis for farm bill payments has been a topic of discussion 
over the last two farm bill debates (Coble and Miller 2006).  Discussion of the 2007 Farm 
Bill has once again picked up the idea of incorporating a revenue based support program, 
including proposals from the National Corn Growers Association (NCGA), American 
Farmland Trust, American Farm Bureau Federation, and the current Administration (Hart 
2007).  Revenue based programs are designed to tie together price and yield risk which 
provides a safety net for farm income, thus assisting farmers when they need it the most.  
Revenue based programs are thought to reduce a producer’s exposure to both price and 
yield risks, helping to provide a more stabilized farm income (Congressional Budget 
Office 1983).  The idea of a stabilized farm income coincides with the definition of 
providing a “safety net” for farmers, which is commonly thought of as an objective of 
U.S. farm policy (United States Department of Agriculture 2006).   
Perhaps the strongest proponent of a revenue based program for the upcoming 
farm bill is NCGA.  NCGA has put forth two revenue based proposals, but little is known 
about how this will impact farmers across the country.  NCGA’s proposals are combined 
with current direct payment and crop insurance programs.  NCGA’s original proposal 
consisted of a “Revenue Counter Cyclical Program” (RCCP) combined with a “Base 
Revenue Protection” (BRP) program.  BRP provides the producer with a guarantee of 
“70% of farm-level, crop-specific net revenue” (National Corn Grower's Association 
2006).  The producer’s crop-specific net revenue is calculated as harvested yield times 
the NASS season average national price less an index of regional estimates of variable 
costs from ERS (National Corn Grower's Association 2006).  On the other hand, RCCP   2
serves as a modified version of the current farm bill’s counter cyclical payment (CCP).  
The major element of modification comes from RCCP being a function of revenue, rather 
than based on prices.  An RCCP payment is made to producers when calculated revenue 
falls below a targeted revenue guarantee.  The county wide guarantee revenue is 
determined by multiplying the county trend yield by a fixed target price (National Corn 
Grower's Association 2006).  The calculated revenue is determined as the NASS county 
yield multiplied by national price.  RCCP payments make up the difference between the 
guaranteed revenue and the calculated, but are limited to be at most 30% of county 
guaranteed revenue (National Corn Grower's Association 2006).  
NCGA made recent revisions to their initial proposal.  The new proposal consists 
of only the RCCP, rather than both the RCCP and BRP.  Additionally, revisions were 
made as to how RCCP is to be calculated.  RCCP is paid out on base acres when 
expected county crop revenue exceeds actual county crop revenue (National Corn 
Grower's Association 2007).  Ninety-five percent of the product of county trend yield and 
the three year average spring futures price will be considered the expected county crop 
revenue (National Corn Grower's Association 2007).  The fall futures price and the 
county yield will be used to determine actual county crop revenue (National Corn 
Grower's Association 2007).      
A proposal for a revenue based counter cyclical payment (CCR) program to 
replace the CCP program that exists in the 2002 Farm Bill was included in the USDA’s 
report of farm bill proposals provided to Congress (Richardson and Outlaw 2007).  A 
CCR payment would be made when the national target revenue per acre is less than 
national revenue per acre (United States Department of Agriculture 2007).   National   3
target revenue is determined as the Olympic average of national yield multiplied by the 
target price less the direct payment rate (United States Department of Agriculture 2007).  
Whereas, “national actual revenue per acre for a commodity would equal the national 
average yield for the commodity times the higher of: (1) the season-average market price 
or (2) the loan rate for the commodity” (United States Department of Agriculture 2007). 
This research is not the first to analyze the potential impacts of a revenue based 
commodity title in the upcoming farm bill.  Richardson and Outlaw (2007) used the Food 
and Agricultural Policy Research Institute’s (FAPRI) 2007 baseline to compare the 
proposed CCR payment relative to CCP payments over the 2008-2016 period on a crop 
by crop basis.  The results of Richardson and Outlaw’s analysis reveal that a budget 
savings of $1.46 billion over the 9 year period would take place due to the 
implementation of the proposed CCR program.   
In a series of staff papers, Aakre, Haugen, and Swenson (2007) look at the 
impacts of the NCGA proposal on Corn, Soybeans, and Spring Wheat in North Dakota 
(Aakre, Haugen and Swenson 2007a; Aakre, Haugen and Swenson 2007b; Aakre, 
Haugen and Swenson 2007c).  The authors used selected counties in North Dakota to 
compare projected payments received by representative farms under the NCGA proposal 
and under the provisions set forth in the 2002 Farm Bill.  Their results indicate that 
soybean producers should receive more payments under NCGA’s proposal, while corn 
and spring wheat producers had mixed results based upon yield variability within each of 
the representative North Dakota counties. 
Olson and DalSanto use two different approaches, one from a historical basis and 
one from a projection standpoint, to compare alternative farm bill proposals (including   4
that of NCGA’s) on Minnesota farms (Olson and DalSanto 2007).  Olson and DalSanto 
use historical prices and yields from 2002 to 2005 to determine government payments 
and crop revenues under each proposal.  Projected revenues and government payments 
for one year are based upon stochastic yields and prices.  These stochastic prices and 
yields were developed using deterministic price forecasts, historical relationships 
between variables, and historical variability.  The simulated payments for the NCGA 
proposal are slightly higher than the simulated payments for the current policy.  Based off 
of their analysis for all of the proposed alternative policies, Olson and DalSanto conclude 
that revenue based programs are a “more appropriate safety net for the future” (Olson and 
DalSanto 2007).   
The aforementioned studies address location specific impacts of farm bill 
proposals on crop farmers or address the impacts of just one proposal.  Olson and 
DalSanto note that further farm level analysis is necessary to develop the complete 
picture of what will happen under revenue based programs (Olson and DalSanto 2007).  
The existing literature may be expanded by addressing a wider geographic region, by 
addressing a wider range of farm types (e.g. primary crops grown), by making broader 
attempts at incorporating the risks and uncertainties with the future, and by making 
comparisons between proposals over a longer time frame. 
The objective of this research is to show how a revenue based farm program will 
impact the economic viability for different types of farms across the United States over 
the next 5 years.  Specifically, this research will make a direct comparison between the 
current farm bill and the revenue based proposals made by the National Corn Growers 
Association (NCGA) and the Administration, revealing impacts at the farm level for a   5
switch to a revenue based program in the upcoming farm bill for feed grain, oilseed, 
cotton, wheat, and rice producers.      
Methodology: 
The impacts of a revenue based policy for twelve representative crop farms were 
evaluated.  The twelve representative farms were selected from the 110 representative 
farms maintained by the Agricultural & Food Policy Center (AFPC).  These 
representative farms were established by collecting information from producer panels to 
create whole farm budgets.  The information collected includes details on the size of the 
operation, enterprises they participate in, fixed costs, historical yields, and costs of 
production for each enterprise.  This information is used to model the specific 
characteristics of alternative policy scenarios in a stochastic farm financial simulation 




Figure 1: Location of AFPC maintained representative farms 
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In an attempt to provide a robust assessment of the impact of NCGA’s and the 
Administration’s revenue based proposals we selected four different types of farms (grain 
and oilseed, wheat, cotton, and rice) from ten states.  The twelve selected farms (three 
from each “type”) were selected for their ability to serve as a representative agent for 
producers in each region.   Table 1 describes the individual characteristics of each 
selected farm.  Analysis conducted on such a diverse group should provide a rich story 
about the effect of a revenue based policy on U.S. farms.   
 
Table 1: Characteristics of Selected Farms 
 
 
Using the payment computations outlined in the background section of this paper 
for both the original and revised NCGA proposals and the CCR proposal, government 
payments and total receipts were calculated for the twelve representative farms for the 
2007 to 2012 period.  As a basis for comparison, government payments under the 2002 
Farm Bill were computed over the same time period. 
Historical and current data from these representative farms was used to create 
stochastic (and in some cases, deterministic) forecasts of future variables.  Planted   7
acreage was assumed to remain constant over the analyzed time frame, including CRP 
acreage and any land used for base acreage purposes only.  A representative farm’s 
decision to participate in multi-peril crop insurance was also assumed to follow their 
historical pattern of purchase. 
The first step of this analysis involved the computation of on-farm receipts.  
Deterministic farm prices were created by applying a wedge, calculated based off of 
historical observations, to FAPRI forecasts for national prices.  These deterministic price 
forecasts were made stochastic by assuming future prices would follow a multivariate 
empirical distribution built off of historical on-farm prices for the representative farm 
from the 1996 to 2006 time period.  Stochastic harvested yield was created by developing 
a trend yield forecast for future years and applying a multivariate empirical distribution 
based off of on-farm harvested yield for each individual representative farm.  Combining 
the stochastic yield and price variables along with planted acreage gave us stochastic total 
receipts for each representative farm in each year. 
Stochastic government payments for 2007-2012 under the base scenario (2002 
Farm Bill) were determined by calculating direct payments, counter-cyclical payments 
(CCP), loan deficiency payments (LDP), and multi-peril crop insurance (MPCI).  Direct 
payment rates and yields were assumed to remain constant at the 2002 level through 
2012.  Total direct payments were calculated on 85% of base acres.  Target prices were 
also assumed to remain constant at 2002 levels.  CCP payment rates were determined as 
the difference between the effective target price and the maximum of either the loan rate 
or the stochastic on-farm price.  Stochastic CCP payments are made using the payment 
rate on 85% of base acres.  LDP rates were determined as the difference of the loan rate 
and the adjusted world price.  Adjusted world price was calculated using a wedge off of 
stochastic forecasted national prices.  Stochastic national prices were taken from the 500 
iterations of FAPRI’s January 2007 baseline.  CRP payment rates and acreage were 
assumed to be held constant over the analyzed time frame.     8
Per acre MPCI premiums for each representative farm were assumed to be held 
constant at their 2006 level.  Actual production history (APH) was determined as the ten 
year average of stochastic actual yields (actual historical yields were used up until 2006, 
while stochastic forecasts were used for years following 2006).  A 70% coverage level 
was assumed for each of the twelve representative farms chosen for this analysis.  The 
2007 guaranteed price is found from the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC).  
Guaranteed prices for subsequent years were forecasted using stochastic FAPRI national 
prices.  Crop insurance payments were assumed to be received when actual yield fell 
below the APH multiplied by the coverage level.  The payment rate was based on the 
difference between the APH and the stochastic actual yield multiplied by the guarantee 
price for each planted acre.  Net MPCI payments were calculated as the per crop 
indemnity payment less the premium.   
The original proposal from NCGA was modeled in two stages, one each for the 
RCCP payment and the BRP payment.  The BRP payment is made when per acre net 
income is less than 70% of the five year Olympic average net income.  Stochastic net 
income per acre was calculated as stochastic FAPRI national prices multiplied by 
stochastic actual yields less trend forecasted costs of production.  The Olympic average 
net income was found using historical net income information from the representative 
farm through 2006 and then stochastic forecasted net income for years following 2006.  
The RCCP payment is based off of county revenue, which is calculated as stochastic on-
farm price multiplied by stochastic county yields.  Stochastic county yields were assumed 
to follow a multivariate empirical distribution following historical NASS county yields.  
Deterministic forecasts of county yields were made using a trend regression.  The target 
revenue level for RCCP is a function of stochastic county yields and the effective target 
price.  RCCP payments are made when stochastic county revenue falls below the 
stochastic target revenue.  RCCP payments are set to be a maximum of the difference 
between the target revenue level and the county revenue guarantee (70% of the product of   9
effective target price and stochastic county yield).  Both RCCP and BRP per acre 
payment rates were multiplied by base acres to determine the total payment for each 
representative farm.  RCCP, BRP, direct payments, and MPCI proceeds were included in 
the calculated stochastic government payments under the original NCGA proposal.      
The revised payment proposal by NCGA requires the use of actual county crop 
revenue and expected county crop revenue, both of which were made stochastic in this 
model.  Expected county crop revenue was defined by the NCGA to be the product of the 
fall futures price and county yield.  County yields for years 2007-2012 were made 
stochastic by assuming they followed a multivariate empirical distribution off of 
historical county yields, having used the trend yield as a deterministic forecast.  Fall 
futures prices were stochastically forecasted by using a stochastic basis relative to 
stochastic national prices.  A historical set of basis’ were developed by subtracting 10 
years of fall futures prices (assumed to be defined as the average October futures price) 
from national average price.  The future basis values were assumed to follow an 
empirical distribution.  Futures prices for sorghum and barley were wedged off of corn 
futures prices.  National average prices for years 2007-2012 were taken from 500 
iterations of FAPRI’s January 2007 baseline.  NCGA defines expected county crop 
revenue as 95% of trend yield times the 3 year average spring futures price.  Again, 
spring futures prices (assumed to be defined as the average futures price for that 
particular crop for the month of April) were stochastically forecasted using a multivariate 
empirical distribution that was built off of a historical basis.  When actual county crop 
revenue is less than the guaranteed crop revenue, the difference is paid out on planted 
acres.  Total government payments for the revised NCGA proposal include the RCCP 
payment, direct payment, and payments for CRP acreage, along with MPCI. 
The final proposal that was analyzed is that of the Administration’s CCR 
program.  Payments are made when national actual revenue falls below national target 
revenue.   National target revenue is built off of the effective target price (target price less   10
direct payment rate) and the 2002-2006 Olympic average crop yield.  National target 
revenue therefore remains constant over the analyzed time period.  In the context of this 
model, national actual revenue is the only stochastic element.  National actual revenue is 
calculated as the national yield, which was taken from 500 iterations of FAPRI’s 2007 
baseline, multiplied by the maximum of either the loan rate or the national season 
average price.  This model utilizes the 500 iterations of FAPRI’s 2007 baseline for 
national season average price.  The payment rate is defined as the difference between the 
national target revenue and actual revenue divided by CCP yields.  Payments are made on 
85% of base acres.  Total government payments for the CCR program incorporate CCR 
payments, direct payments, LDP, and any payments received for CRP acreage.  
The model that was created allows the operator to select a farm for analysis and 
then select the crops on that particular farm to be analyzed.  For the purposes of this 
paper, all results are reported from a whole farm basis (i.e. total government payments 
incorporates all of the government payments projected to be received by that individual 
farm for all of its on-farm activities).   
Results: 
  Stochastic total receipts and stochastic government payments for each of the 12 
representative farms were simulated for 500 iterations.  An additional key output variable 
(KOV) was identified as being whether or not payments for that specific program were 
received in a particular year.  This binary variable (0 if payments were not received and 1 
if payments were received) was also simulated for 500 iterations over each of the twelve 
representative farms.  
As one may expect the result vary significantly between the types of farms 
analyzed, but there is also significant variability within farm categories.  Table 2 provides   11
a summary of the simulations, displaying the average annual probability of receiving 
payments in the 2007-2012 period.  It is interesting to note that although CCR payments 
for cotton and rice farms are occurring at a relatively high frequency, the dollar value of 
those payments is very low.  The 4000 acre California cotton farm (CAC4000) had an 
average total CCR payment of $157 in 2007 and $67 in 2012, while the 3640 acre 
Arkansas rice farm (ARSR3640) had an average total CCR payment of $490 in 2007 and 
$187 in 2012.  Based solely on frequency of payments, we can see that all 4 types of 
farms should prefer at least one of the analyzed options relative to receiving CCP and 
LDP payments under the 2002 farm bill structure.     
 
Table 2: Average Annual Probability of Receiving Payments 
 
 
  As a snapshot of the model results, Appendix A offers cumulative density 
functions (CDF) of total government payments for the grain and oilseed farms for years   12
2008 and 2012.  Over all three grain and oilseed farms analyzed, the revised NCGA 
proposal maintains a positive probability over the largest dollar amounts (2008 
government payments for ING1000 is the single exception).  The vertical portion of each 
CDF represents constant minimum payments under each particular scenario, generally 
direct payments less crop insurance premiums (should they apply).  In all cases CCR not 
only provides the smallest probability of receiving a payment larger than the minimum 
payment, but also provides one of the smallest payments when the CCR payments do 
kick in.  With respect to these selected grain and oilseed farms, there is not a particular 
proposal that first order stochastically dominates the others, but based on this analysis it 
is not unreasonable to expect a strong preference for the NCGA proposals by grain and 
oilseed producers. 
  The wheat farms that we analyzed provided interesting results; Appendix B 
displays CDFs for wheat government payments in years 2008 and 2012.  Perhaps the 
most striking result is the completely vertical line for CCR payments in all cases, 
indicating that CCR payments never significantly come into affect for all 4 of the wheat 
farms analyzed (the probabilities represented in Table 2 show CCR payments coming 
into play about 1% of the time, however these payments are of such a small magnitude 
that the CDFs for wheat farms fail to significantly reflect these positive payments). 
MTW4500 show consistently large RCCP and BRP payments such that during all 500 
iterations there are positive payments beyond what this farm would have earned with 
CRP and direct payments.  The base farm bill and the revised NCGA proposal have 
government payments less than those from CCR for approximately 40% of the time on 
the MTW4500, representing the proportion of the time in which premiums are paid for   13
MPCI and no indemnities are received.  Over all three wheat farms, it is clear that both of 
the NCGA proposals offer the potential of higher upside payments. 
  The four scenarios “pull away” from each other in the cotton farms more so than 
in any of the other types of farms. Appendix C offers CDFs of the cotton farms analyzed 
in both 2008 and 2012.  With the exception of the NCGA proposals changing positions, 
the results for the cotton farms appear to be relatively consistent.  CCR payments come 
into play about 30% of the time in 2008 and 20% of the time in 2012.  The two NCGA 
proposals have the positive probabilities assigned to the highest level of potential 
government payments.  Government payments in 2012 from the original NCGA proposal 
on the Texas cotton farm offer the only case of first order stochastic dominance; 
however, it is clear that either of the two NCGA proposals are likely to be preferred by a 
majority of producers on farms comparable to these three cotton farms we have analyzed. 
  Perhaps the most consistent set of farms analyzed were the rice farms (see 
Appendix D).  CA550 and TX1350 had no prior MPCI participation and thus have the 
same starting point for payments (total direct payments for that particular farm) for all 
four scenarios analyzed.  Reviewing where each of these scenarios “leave” the vertical 
line reveals the frequency at which the payments occur.  In most cases, the original 
NCGA proposal is the first to come into play, while CCR payments are the last to move 
beyond the initial starting point.    
Conclusions:  
  These above results appear to be consistent with the findings of Richardson and 
Outlaw (2007) that CCR would result in a budget savings for the government.  
Additionally, the results of Aakre, Haugen, and Swenson (2007), along with those of   14
Olson and DalSanto (2007), are confirmed indicating that the NCGA proposal will 
expand the payments received by producers.  This research extends the prior work, 
revealing specific impacts for representative farms across alternative crops and 
alternative U.S. locations.   
While there is no particular proposal that stands out over all farms and all years 
analyzed, the two proposals by the NCGA offer the most potential for larger upside 
government payments.  In addition, as table 2 revealed, the NCGA proposals offered a 
frequency that is at least as comparable to payments under the 2002 farm bill.  These two 
concluding points make it clear that producers would generally prefer the NCGA 
proposals to either the Administration’s proposal of the revenue based countercyclical 
payments or to remaining under the current programs of the 2002 Farm Bill.   
    15
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Appendix A- Grain and Oilseed Government Payments 
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Appendix B- Wheat Government Payments 
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Appendix C- Cotton Government Payments 
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Appendix D- Rice Government Payments 
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